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Abstract
In order for a reason to justify an action or attitude it must be
one that is possessed by an agent. Knowledge-centric views of posses-
sion ground our possession of reasons, at least partially, either in our
knowledge of them or in our being in a position to know them. But on
virtually all accounts, knowing P is some kind of non-accidental true
belief that P. This entails that knowing P is a kind of non-accidental
true representation that P. I outline a novel theory of the epistemic
requirement on possession in terms of this more general state of non-
accidental true representation. It is just as well placed to explain the
motivations behind knowledge-centric views of possession, and it is
also better placed to explain the extent of the reasons we possess in
certain cases of deductive belief-updates and cases involving environ-
mental luck. I conclude with three reflections. First, I indicate how
my arguments generate a dilemma for Lord’s (2018) view that possess-
ing reasons is just a matter of being in a position to manifest one’s
1
knowledge how to use them. Second, I explain how my view can si-
multaneously manage cases of environmental luck without falling prey
to lottery cases. Finally, I sketch the direction for a further range of
counterexamples to knowledge-centric theories of possession.1
It is now common, though not uncontroversial, to regard facts as the norma-
tive reasons that justify our actions and attitudes. But in order for a fact to
be a reason that justifies an action or attitude for a given agent it must be
a fact that is possessed by that agent. There are a range of views of what it
takes to possesses a fact in a way that allows it to function as a reason for an
agent, and as has become increasingly common in recent epistemology some
have sought to put knowledge in the theoretical forefront. Accordingly, one
prominent class of views are centered on knowledge: we possess a fact P as
a reason only if we know P (Williamson 2000; Littlejohn 2017) or we are in
a position to know P (Lord 2018; Neta 2017).
Discussions of knowledge-centric views of possession have largely over-
looked the insight that knowledge is itself an instance of a kind. Quite
roughly, if knowing that P is a form of non-accidental true belief that P,
and belief is but one way representing P, then knowledge is but one kind of
non-accidental true representation. I stipulatively call the general state of
non-accidental true representation of which knowledge is an instance ‘aware-
ness’. I explore the implications of different substantive characterizations of
awareness in light of recent theories of knowledge. The upshot is an alter-
native way of thinking about possession: S possess a fact P as a reason only
if S is in a position to be aware that P. This account of possession is logi-
cally weaker than knowledge-centric accounts, allowing for the possession of
reasons in a range of cases where knowledge and the potential for knowledge
1Acknowledgements: This paper would not be what it is without the valuable con-
tributions of two anonymous referees, Ram Neta, Francesco Praolini, Clayton Littlejohn,
Sven Bernecker, Thomas Grundmann, Ori Beck, Joachim Horvath, Jessica Brown, Anna-
Maria Asunta Eder, Daniel Greco, Eyal Tal, Luis Rosa, Sofia Bokros, Giulia Napolitano,
Lisa Benossi, Jakob Ohlhorst, Errol Lord, Lisa Miracchi, and Dan Singer.
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are absent. I argue that this is just the result we need if we’re to explain the
reasons we possess in cases of environmental luck and certain very ordinary
cases involving explicit deductive updates.
It must be emphasized that what I’m primarily investigating in this paper
is the epistemic relation agents must stand in to facts in order to possess them
as reasons to respond in some way. But there is more to possessing facts as
reasons than standing in a suitable epistemic relation to those facts. For
example, in order to possess something as a reason to dance a jig I arguably
have to be able to dance a jig as well as be capable of using P to dance a jig.
These are potential practical constraints on possessing facts as reasons for a
response and there is much to say about such constraints (cf. Whiting 2014;
Sylvan 2015; Littlejohn 2017; Lord 2018: ch.4). While the emphasis of my
paper is on the epistemic condition involved in possessing facts as reasons, I
will conclude with a brief reflection on how my arguments undermine Lord’s
view of the practical condition involved in possession.
1 Background I: A Quick Primer on Reasons-
First Epistemology
The reasons-first approach to justification is reductionistic. It purports to
give us an illuminating and complete account of ultima facie justification
(rationality) in terms of the possession of sufficient reasons. That is, what
it is for an action or an attitude to be ultima facie justified just is for one
to possess sufficient reason for performing that action or for having that
attitude.2 This generates three questions: what are reasons? when are they
sufficient? and what does it take to possess them? In what follows I’ll
summarize a prominent answer to the first two questions before introducing
2This is obviously a characterization of ultima facie propositional justification; doxastic
justification requires more. See Carter and Bondy (forthcoming) and Silva and Oliveira
(forthcoming).
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two knowledge-centric ways of answering the third.
What are reasons? When it comes to the ontology of reasons, the stan-
dard view in metaethics and a quickly growing view among epistemologists is
that reasons are either facts or true propositions. For expressive convenience
I will identify facts with true propositions and refer to the resulting view of
reasons as broad factualism. The driving motivation behind broad factual-
ism has to do with our justificatory practices: we reference (or attempt to
reference) facts when engaged in the activity of justifying the actions and
attitudes of ourselves and others. We say things like: the fact that there are
elephants in Africa is a reason to believe that they’ve not yet gone extinct,
and the fact that you’re hungry is a reason to get a snack, and the fact that
a potential action would cause harm is a reason to refrain from that action,
and so forth. When we recognize that our attempts to justify actions and
attitudes reference falsehoods rather than facts we view the attempted justi-
fication as defective. Those who take reasons to be facts take this aspect of
our justificatory practice as illuminating the sources of our justification for
our attitudes and actions, i.e. facts.3 If you think falsehoods as well as facts
can be reasons that justify actions and attitudes you can think of this paper
as a paper about the possession of objective reasons and a corresponding sort
of objective justification (Whiting 2014; Sylvan 2015; Schroeder 2015a).
When are reasons sufficient? Generally, sufficiency is regarded as a mat-
ter of weightiness: S has sufficient reason to believe P iff the reasons S pos-
sesses for believing P are at least as weighty as the reasons S possesses for
not believing P. Talk of the weight of reasons is meant to capture the way in
which reasons can “stack-up” in favor and in opposition to certain responses.
For example, in the case of belief you can have all kinds of reasons to believe
3Broad factualism is arguably the dominant position in the literature on the normativity
of action (Scanlon 1998; Raz 1999; Dancy 2000; Schroeder 2007; Thomson 2008; Alvarez
2010; Skorupski 2011; Parfit 2011; Whiting 2014; Kiesewetter 2017) and it has already
secured a stable and growing place in current epistemological treatments of the normativity
of belief (Williamson 2000; Whiting 2014; Schroeder 2015a; Lord 2018, 2018b; Littlejohn
2017; Kiesewetter 2017; Sylvan 2015, 2016, 2018).
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P and all kinds of reasons to refrain from believing P. But you only have
sufficient reason to believe P when your reasons in favor of believing are not
outweighed by your reasons to refrain (Lord and Maguire 2016). For the most
part this way of thinking about sufficiency is independent of one’s stance on
the nature of reasons.
What does it take to possess a reason? Broad factualists need to say
something substantive about what it takes to possess (= to access, to have) a
reason. For if reasons are facts or true propositions they are not automatically
within one’s ken in a way that could justify one’s attitudes and actions
(Williamson 2000; Whiting 2014; Schroeder 2015a; Sylvan 2015, 2016, 2018;
Littlejohn 2017; Neta 2017; Lord 2018). Imagine that you are currently
standing in front of an oak tree and you have no other information about the
oak apart from your general knowledge of oaks and what you can visually
“pick up” about this oak while looking at it. The fact that the oak you’re
looking at is 613 inches tall is a conclusive reason to believe that the oak is
between 612 and 614 inches tall. But if you are wholly ignorant of the fact
that it’s 613 inches tall, then without further information about its height
you cannot justifiedly believe that the oak is between 612 and 614 inches tall.
This idea is generally agreed upon and so it’s generally assumed among broad
factualists that an understanding of the nature of the epistemic aspect of the
reasons-possession relation is essential to the integrity of the reasons-first
approach to justification.
In what follows I assume one cannot possess a reason without possessing
it as a reason for at least some kind of response. Accordingly, given broad
factualism, ‘S possesses a reason’ is short for ‘S possesses a fact as a reason
to respond in some way.’ When it matters I will specify what is included in
the relevant range of responses.
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2 Background II: Motivations for Knowledge-
Centric Views of Possession
One prominent view of possession is centered on knowledge: we possess only
those facts that we know (Williamson 2000; Littlejohn 2017):4
Possession Requires Knowledge
(P→K) S possesses a fact P as a reason to φ only if S knows P.
Williamson (2000) and Littlejohn (2017) are both proponents of (P→K) and
their motivations for it largely overlap in that they appeal to cases where we
seem not to possess a reason, P, because we fail to know P. I’ll focus attention
on Littlejohn’s recent defense of (P→K) in this section and return in the final
section of this paper to discuss the lottery-like cases that Williamson (2000)
has used in defense of (P→K).
While Littlejohn (2017: 26-27) points to various criteria a theory of pos-
session must satisfy, the main argument that favor’s his knowledge-centric
view of possession is driven by a kind of gettier case:
Consider Nozick’s experience machine. Agnes undergoes a series
of experiences that dispose her to form false beliefs about her
surroundings. It seems to her that she and everyone she cares
about are flourishing. [While nearly all of her beliefs are mis-
taken] some of her beliefs happen to be true. ...it seems to her
that her brother has just crossed the stage at graduation and a
smile stretches across Agnes’ face because she believes he just
graduated. What the lab technicians don’t realize is that pre-
cisely as Agnes undergoes this experience her brother crosses the
stage and accepts his diploma.
4On Williamson’s (2000) view evidence is to be identified with true propositions, and
the evidence one has (=possesses) includes all and only the true propositions one knows.
Accordingly, Williamson counts as a broad factualist who takes knowledge to be the rele-
vant possession relation.
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Here’s Littlejohn’s (2017: 26-27) judgement about Agnes and her reasons:
While she believes correctly that her brother is graduating and is
happy because she believes this, her reason for being happy isn’t
that her brother is graduating. She cannot be rationally guided
by such a fact, not when she’s cut off from reality.
Littlejohn is right, Agnes is not nor can she be happy for the reason that her
brother is graduating. Though she truly believes this, she’s too far separated
from that fact for it to be a reason she could respond to in any way. As
Littlejohn argues, it seems plausible that possessing a reason requires at
least the possibility of responding to it. Accordingly, Agnes fails to possess
the fact that her brother is graduating as a reason. And (P→K) can easily
explain this fact since Agnes is unable to know that her brother is graduating.
But not all knowledge-centric theorists have been so optimistic about
(P→K). Against (P→K), Lord (2018: 72ff) draws attention to counterexam-
ples involving inattention. Here’s an instance of this kind of counterexample:
Inattentive Perception
I have a carpet in my home that looks like this:
I love the way it looks, so does my family. Suppose you came
over for dinner one evening. You’d have a visual experience not
unlike the one you’re having now, and there are all kinds of facts
that your visual experience would seem to put you in possession
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of even if you did not believe them. For example, (F1) that each
determinate color in each square occurs exactly four times, (F2)
that there are two determinate shades of blue, (F3) that there are
four rows, etc. There is an exceptionally large number of facts
that this perceptual experience could give you access to while
having the perceptual experience, but many of these facts will
not be converted into beliefs simply because you’re not paying
attention to them.
Before coming into my home you had no beliefs about (F1)-(F3), and even
while looking at my carpet you might not come to believe (F1)-(F3) simply
because you’re attention is elsewhere, e.g. suppose we were having a rich and
gripping philosophical conversation while you were absently looking directly
at this carpet. But since you’re looking directly at this carpet it seems like
you’re unjustified in failing to believe (MoreBlue): that there are more (de-
terminable) blue squares than any other colored square.5 What could explain
this lack of justification? Not your knowledge of, say, (F1) and (F2). For
you don’t believe (F1) or (F2) because you’re attention is swept up by our
conversation. So (P→K) doesn’t allow you to posses (F1) and (F2). But
if your non-belief in (MoreBlue) is unjustified while you’re looking at my
carpet this has to be explained by reasons that you have access to, and in
the present case it seems like this will have to include (F1) and (F2). This
is a problem for (P→K).
If knowledge is to be central to our understanding of the possession of
reasons and if we are to take cases of inattention as counterexamples to
(P→K), what we need is a theory of possession that can explain how I possess
(F1) and (F2) in Inattentive Perception. But it must be a theory of possession
that retains the explanatory power of (P→K), which lies with it’s ability
to explain why Agnes fails to possess the fact that her brother has just
5While you are unjustified, I would not say you are blameworthy for failing to believe
(MoreBlue).
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graduated.
Lord (2018: 67-96) and Neta (2017) offer just the thing. When it comes
only to the epistemic constraints on possessing a fact the following holds:
Possession Requires the Position to Know
(P→PK) S possesses a fact P as a reason to φ only if S is in a
position to know P.
Lord (2018: 92) characterizes being in a position to know as follows:
You’re in a position to know P when all the impersonal conditions
for knowledge are met. The personal conditions are (1) believing
P and (2) believing P for the right reasons. The impersonal con-
ditions are just whatever are left over. [Like the truth of P and
standing in a non-accidental relation to it.]6
While knowing is a logically stronger relation than being in a position to
know, they both involve truth and non-accidentality requirements. Thus, for
example, if knowledge requires safe belief, then being in a position to know
requires being in a position to safely believe. Since Agnes neither safely
believes that her brother is graduating nor is she in a position to safely
believe it, it follows on a safety view of knowledge that Agnes neither knows
nor is she in a position to know that her brother is graduating. And thus
by (P→PK) it follows that Agnes doesn’t possess that fact. Accordingly, the
truth of (P→PK) seems just as well placed as (P→K) to help us understand
why our intuitive judgement about Agnes is correct.
Furthermore, in Inattentive Perception while you do not know (F1) or
(F2) you’re clearly in a position to know them despite your inattention. For
as Lord (2018: 92) characterizes it, if you don’t already know P you may
yet be in a position to know P (and hence stand in a relevant non-accidental
relation to P) if “in [such] uninferential cases...you have some experiences
6Neta (2017) characterizes it similarly.
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such that, if you could and did attend to certain features of those experiences
and uninferentially form a belief that P in the right kind of way, then you
would know that P.” Clearly, this condition can hold in cases like Inattentive
Perception with regard to you and (F1) and (F2), thereby giving (P→PK)
an explanatory advantage over (P→K).
3 Problems for Knowledge-Centric Accounts of
Possession
In this section I lay out two problems with knowledge-first accounts of pos-
session. The first concerns explicit deductive updates. The second concerns
environmental luck.
3.1 Explicit Deductive Updates
Just as it was plausible to think that we could come to possess reasons even
before we came to believe and know them when inattentive (as in Inattentive
Perception), it’s even more plausible to think that we can come to possess new
reasons by being attentive to entailment relations from existing knowledge.
Here is an example. I know (G): that North Rhine-Westphalia is the
most populated state within Germany and that Germany has no more than 85
million residents. This entails (N): that North Rhine-Westphalia has no more
than 85 million residents. And through a simple exercise of my deductive
competences I can come to know: that (G) entails (N). Now deduction itself
is not a belief-entailing activity. One can deduce P from Q without coming
to believe Q. Think of all the deductive exercises you were required to do
with obviously false premises in order to help you get a grip on the difference
between validity and soundness. When the premises were obviously false you
didn’t (I hope) believe their conclusions despite deducing them. Similarly,
coming to know that an argument’s premises entail its conclusion is also not
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an activity the ensures one believes the conclusion.
Now consider the fact that when it comes to agents like us, we sometimes
update our beliefs in response to (and therefore after) recognizing entailments
from our beliefs. That is:
Explicit Deductive Updating
It is possible for a thinker S to first come to know P and to know
P entails Q, and then in response to begin her update process so
that she later comes to believe Q.7
Explicit Deductive Updating identifies not just a possible way to update, but
an ordinary one. To see this let’s continue with the example above.
It was, embarrassingly, not so long ago that I learned that North-Rhine
Westphalia was a German state. So it was not so long ago that I failed to
know (G). But even before knowing (G) I could easily have known that (G)
entails (N) since (N) is a rather obvious deductive consequence of (G). To
know it I need only have been presented with (G) and (N) and reflected on
their rather obvious logical relations. In such a case it is possible that I would
first come to know (G) and know that (G) entails (N), and then in response
update my beliefs so that I believe and come to know (N). This is an explicit
deductive update.
Explicit deductive updates are a two-stage process. They involve first
recognizing an entailment from one’s knowledge, and after that responding
to that recognition by forming a new belief in the conclusion. I’m interested
in what reasons I possess in between the recognition and the response. That
is, after deducing (N) from (G) but before coming to believing (N), what
epistemic relation do I stand in to (N)?
It seems implausible to say that I’m ignorant of or blind to that fact–
surely ignorance of (N) is incompatible with consciously deducing (N) from
7Obviously, not all deductive updating need be via explicit knowledge of entailment
relations. One can also just come to believe P by deducing it from Q while not consciously
appreciating the fact that Q entails P.
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my knowledge of (G). And if I’m not ignorant of (N), then don’t I possess
it? It’s intuitive to think that I do have epistemic access to (N). At the very
least, it’s just as intuitive to think that I possess (N) in virtue of deducing
(N) from my knowledge of (G) as it is intuitive to think that I possess (F1)
and (F2) in Inattentive Perception above. We can capture this idea with a
kind of closure principle for possession:
Extended Possession
Other things being equal, if S knows that P is entailed by some-
thing she knows, then S possess the fact P as a reason for a
response.
In the case of my deduction of (N) from my knowledge of (G), Extended
Possession implies that I possess (N) unless something odd is going on such
that “other things are not equal.” This is a wrinkle we needn’t worry about
with regard to the case at issue involving (G) and (N).8
Together Extended Possession and Explicit Deductive Updating cause
problems for knowledge-centric theories of possession. (P→K) is straightfor-
wardly inconsistent with Extended Possession and Explicit Deductive Up-
dating. This is because Extended Possession implies that in cases of Explicit
Deductive Updating there are facts we possess before we believe them, and
hence before we know them. Thus there are facts we can possess without
knowing them. So we have one more reason to reject (P→K).
8When are other things not equal? Plausibly, the same sorts of conditions that seem
to compromise naive transmission principles for justification will apply here. But those
compromising conditions don’t seem to apply in this kind of case and in most ordinary
cases of deduction from knowledge. For example, (N) is not a “heavyweight” anti-skeptical
proposition like “I’m not a BIV”; the inference to (N) from (G) is not epistemically circular
in the sense that my reasons for thinking (G) is true depend on me first having justification
to believe (N); and there are no defeaters lurking in the background such that I have good
reason to think (N) is false or my inferential capacities are malfunctioning or whatever. In
other words, provided I already know (G) and my knowledge of (G) doesn’t antecedently
depend on (N), I can come to possess (N) by deducing it from (G). See Tucker (2020) for
further discussion of transmission.
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Notice that Extended Possession and Explicit Deductive Updating don’t
immediately cause problems for (P→PK). Since (P→PK) doesn’t imply that
believing or knowing P is required for possessing P. (P→PK) only says that
being in a position to know is necessary. So the advocate of (P→PK) need
only explain how one can possess reasons in cases of Explicit Deductive Up-
dating before coming to know them.
Lord’s (2018) discussion of (P→PK) on this point is admirably clear, and
he explains it in terms of the following condition for being in a position to
inferentially know (Lord 2018: 92):
...it’s possible to be in a position to know P when you don’t believe
[and thus don’t know] P. In cases like this, what is it in virtue of
which you are in a position to know P? In the inferential cases,
it’s the fact that you have some beliefs with contents such that, if
you could and did attend to those contents and inferentially form
a belief that P in the right way, you would know P.
Put differently:
Counterfactual Inferential Knowledge
When S does not already know P, S is in a position to inferentially
know P iff S has some beliefs with contents such that, if S could
and did attend to those contents and inferentially form a belief
that P in the right way, S would know P.
Since I can come by such knowledge after properly forming a belief in (N)
on the basis of my knowledge of (G) and that (G) entails (N), I count as
being in position to know (N) even before I believe it. Thus, (P→PK) allows
me to possess (N) even before I come to know it. This is just what we need
(P→PK) to do if it’s to remain consistent with Extended Possession and
Explicit Deductive Updating.
But there is trouble here. Counterfactual Inferential Knowledge yields
too strict a theory of possession, one that turns out to be inconsistent with
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Extended Possession. Take the following possible scenario:
Kripkean Study
I’m part of a psychological experiment that is aimed at testing
my responsiveness to my reasons as well as the extent to which
I’m subject to the error of Kripkean dogmatism (though I do not
know that this is what is being tested).9 The psychologists test
this by giving me new knowledge and then helping me realize
new logical consequences of my new knowledge. So they give me
some new, non-misleading evidence E that actually enables me
to come to know (G). Then they explain why (G) deductively
entails (N). (Assume this deductive consequence was unknown to
me before the study.) Since I’m rational this would ordinarily
bring about a new belief in (N) on the basis of my knowledge
that (G) and that (G) entails (N). But ever so quickly, as they
intended, before I form my belief in (N) the psychologists give me
a defeater for my original knowledge that (G). Specifically, just
after after helping me come to know that (G) entails (N) they very
quickly and convincingly tell me a lie: that the original evidence
I was relying on for (G) was all fabricated for the purposes of
the experimental study and that (G) is indeed false. (This is
not true. The evidence is real and (G) is true.) Since I’m not a
crazed Kripkean dogmatist and since I don’t know they’re lying
to me about their “fabrication”, I don’t ignore what they tell me.
Rather, I give up my belief in (G) and so cease to know (G).
For me and other possible participants in this type of study it will be false
that: were I to form a belief in (N) in response to an explicit deduction from
my knowledge of (G) and knowledge that (G) entails (N), then I would know
9The Kripkean dogmatist is someone who comes to know P on E at t1 and at all future
times, t+1, believes P on E despite acquiring defeaters that rob them of knowledge and
rational belief at those future times.
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(N). This is due to the fact that the study is constructed in such a way that
I’m supposed to be given a defeater for (G) before I have a chance to believe
(N). So if the study is reliably executed, then it’s false that I would come to
know (N). There are just too many nearby worlds where I get the defeater
before I come to believe and know (G), and the actual world is one such
world. So according to Counterfactual Inferential Knowledge I am not in a
position to know (N).
The point here is that Kripkean Study is a possible situation. About
this possible situation (P→PK) and Counterfactual Inferential Knowledge
together imply that in such a case I do not possess (N). But that’s inconsistent
with Extended Possession. For there is some small amount of time where I
know (G) and know that (G) entails (N)–it’s the short amount of time it takes
for the psychologists to give me the defeater for my belief and knowledge
of (G). So Extended Possession, (P→PK), and Counterfactual Inferential
Knowledge form an inconsistent set.
Some advocates of (P→PK) might seek to undermine the objection aris-
ing from Kripkean Study by undermining the idea that (N), while a fact in
Kripkean Study, is not a fact that can function as a reason for me. Recall
that possessing a fact, P, as a reason to respond in some way requires that I
be able to respond to P in some way. And it’s not clear just what responses
are available to me if I’m going to be given a defeater so quickly. But it takes
only a moment to appreciate that even in Kripkean Study I can possess (N)
as a reason to update my beliefs or at least as a reason to begin to update my
beliefs so that I give up or begin to give up my non-belief in (N).10 This will
involve me becoming increasingly confident in (N) and forming the disposi-
tions to act and think on (N) in the ways characteristic of belief. Beginning
to update my beliefs in these ways is clearly consistent with being given a
10As a consequence, this case shows that some cases of inference can be cases where
the fact that P is among one’s reason for believing that P. This has usually only been
endorsed in regard to perception and other more direct cases of representation (see Hopp
2012; Schroeder 2011, 2015a; Lord 2018a: 75ff; Sosa 2015: 197-198).
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defeater before that update process is completed.
Some advocates of (P→PK) might seek to undermine the objection aris-
ing from Kripkean Study by seeking to refine Counterfactual Inferential
Knowledge so that these problems don’t arise. For example, one could do
away with the counterfactual aspect of Counterfactual Knowledge and thus
do away with its implicit constraint that I possess only those reasons that I
would know in all nearby worlds–i.e. in circumstances not importantly differ-
ent from one’s actual circumstances. But this is a very attractive feature of
Counterfactual Knowledge. For ordinary ways of thinking and talking about
being in a position to know that are of normative significant for deliberation
don’t seem to track the weaker notion of it being possible to know in circum-
stances that may be importantly different from one’s actual circumstances.
In the present case, the important difference will involve the psychologists
not giving me a defeater despite my participating in study where they intend
to give me a defeater. The primary worry I have about weakening the target
concept of being in a position to know in this way concerns the normative
significance of what goes on in increasingly distant worlds. For, by definition,
the reasons I possess are the facts that I have access to in my actual situation
and they are facts that call for responses in my actual situation. But why
should my knowledge in non-actual, distant worlds have an impact on what
I should do or think or feel in the actual world?
3.2 Environmental Luck
Case of environmental luck are taken to be Gettier cases by many episte-
mologists, thus, by definition, these epistemologists take them to be cases of
justified true belief that fail to be cases of knowledge. Consider the following
case:
Hooligan
Bad Henry is a hooligan. He delights in wanton property destruc-
tion. Today he wants to destroy a barn. He knows what barns
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look like and he can reliably visually identify barns as barns when
looking at a barn at a reasonable distance in normal (local) vi-
sual conditions. He drives out into the country to find a barn. He
pulls over after an hour, retrieves his bazooka, and takes aim with
unerring accuracy at the first roadside barn he looks at. He thinks
to himself: “I’m looking at a barn.” Calm, cool, and collected he
pulls the trigger and then thinks to himself: “My projectile will
destroy the barn.” However, unbeknownst to Henry he is in an
epistemically unfriendly environment when it comes to finding
barns since most objects that look like barns in these parts are
in fact barn facades.11
When Henry stops in front of the barn is it plausible that Henry possesses
the fact that the object he’s looking at is a barn? This is a question that
can be hard to answer directly. When I, for example, consider the question I
don’t have clear intuitions either way. But we can home in on an answer to
this question by considering a related question.
Notice that the fact that the object Henry is looking at is a barn is a
fact that gives (or could give) Henry a reason to respond in various ways.
For example, it’s a reason to run in the direction of the barn if in need of
shelter, it is a reason to place a substantial bet on the claim that the object
he’s looking at is a barn, it is a reason to believe that barn-related supplies
are inside the object he’s looking at, it is a reason to believe that a barn
will be destroyed by his projectile, and so forth. In the story Henry actually
responds in one of these ways: before destroying the barn Henry formed a
belief in (Destruction): that a barn will be destroyed by the projectile.
Is Henry justified in holding that belief in (Destruction)? In answer to
this question I do have a clear intuition: his belief is justified. I cannot
see how Henry fails to have a justified belief. Indeed, in taking cases of
environmental luck to be Gettier cases it is widely assumed that these are
11Turri (2011), cf. Pritchard (2012).
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cases of justified belief. But if it’s justified he must possess reasons that
justify the belief. What are his reasons? Doubtless if we were in Henry’s
position and we were asked to cite our reasons that justify our belief we
would respond by citing the fact that the object we’re looking at is a barn
and some facts about bazookas.12 But if Henry possesses the fact that that
the object he’s looking at is a barn, it is a fact he possesses in circumstances
of environmental luck.
Accordingly, on the assumption that Hooligan is a Gettier case it gives
us evidence for two theses:
No Environmentally Lucky Knowledge: Usual cases of environ-
mental luck are cases of non-accidental true belief that P, but the
type of non-accidentality present in cases of environmental luck
is insufficient for knowing or being in a position to know P.
Environmentally Lucky Possession: S can possess a fact P as a
reason even if one’s non-accidental true belief that P is formed in
circumstances involving environmental luck.
If these two claims are true, then (P→PK) and (P→K) are false.13
12Littlejohn (2017) rejects the idea that we can possess reasons in cases of environmental
luck and provides alternative cases of environmental luck in support of his rejection. In
my view Littlejohn’s cases seem like relevant variations on fake barn cases only because
the agents are in situations where it’s intuitive to attribute to them additional defeating
information. There is a further worry about Littlejohn’s use of his alternative cases in
that there seems to be a subtle reliance on the idea that perceptual recognition that o
is F ensures that one knows that o is F. Littlejohn exploits this in the direction of a
modus tollens. But this principle is substantially undermined by the knowledge-awareness
distinction which issues an alternative: perceptual recognition that o is F ensures that one
is aware that o is F. It is at the very least coherent and consistent with the motivations
of the awareness-driven approach being developed here to maintain the latter: fake barn
cases are cases of awareness without knowledge.
13A referee suggested that Henry might have “weaker” reasons that justify his belief in
(Destruction) and this would be consistent with a knowledge-centric view of possession.
In response, notice that from Henry’s point of view the fact he possesses and responds
to by taking aim at the barn and in believing (Destruction) is the fact that the object he
is (was) looking at is (was) a barn. Not some weaker reason. So Henry fails to act and
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4 Awareness: A Generalization of Knowledge
The arguments from section 2 in defense of the idea that knowledge is central
to possession turn on the way in which being accidentally related to a fact
can prevent you from possessing it. Knowing and being in a position to know
both rule out such an accidental relation, thereby giving knowledge-centric
views of possession an advantage over other views of possession that permit
one to be accidentally related to their reasons. But knowing P and being in
a position to know P are not the only ways of being non-accidentally related
to P.
It is widely accepted on nearly all accounts of knowledge that knowledge
is a type of non-accidentally true belief. The idea that knowledge requires
true belief has been remarkably stable among philosophers despite occasional
resistance, and I will not be defending it here.14 The idea that knowledge is
a kind of non-accidentally true belief has also been a mainstay among episte-
mologists. Of course, there are many intuitive senses in which a belief might
count as “non-accidental” and epistemologists have been hard at work try-
ing to identify the relevant non-accidentality relation that is constitutive of
knowledge. The leading options here are familiar, including (but not limited
to) process reliablism, proper functionalism, virtue reliabilism, safety theo-
ries, sensitivity theories, explanationist theories). Below I will mention where
taking a stance on this can make a difference to one’s theory of awareness
and possession.
Belief (outright belief) is a representational mental state with proposi-
tional content, i.e. it is a mental state that represents propositions as being
true of the world. But believing P isn’t just a matter of representing the
to believe for those other weaker reasons (whatever they are). Thus, those other reasons
cannot (or at least do not) explain the ex post justification of his action and belief. But
the idea that his belief is ex post justified seems very intuitive. Indeed, in taking cases of
environmental luck to be Gettier cases it is assumed that it’s a case of not just ex ante
justified to believe, it’s a case of ex post justified belief as well.
14See Buckwalter, Rose, and Turri (2015) for a recent defense of this.
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world as if P is true, believing P also involves dispositions to act and think
in ways that presuppose the truth of P in a certain range of circumstances.
For example, agents who believe P are agents who have the disposition to
act on P, assert P, and draw inferences from P in a certain range of cir-
cumstances. But the idea that ‘belief’ in epistemically central uses refers to
a representational state with propositional content that involves these mini-
mal dispositions is generally agreed upon in both the philosophy of mind and
epistemology.15 Since beliefs are a kind of representational state it follows
that true beliefs are a kind of true representation.
Thus it follows that knowledge is a kind of non-accidental true representa-
tion. For expressive convenience I will stipulatively use the term ‘awareness’
to refer to the target state of non-accidental true representation of which
knowledge is an instance. Accordingly, the argument to follow is not be-
ing guided by ordinary usage of the term ‘awareness’, which is non-trivially
polysemous.
To say knowledge is a kind of awareness is to leave much unsaid. For the
account of awareness for safety theorists will be different than the account of
awareness for virtue epistemologists, and this will in turn be different than
the account of awareness for proper functionalists, and so on. This is just
because they each take different stances on the nature of knowledge and
thus will likely take different stances on awareness. These are differences
that can make a difference as I will discuss below. But the overall argument
against (P→PK) and (P→K) will stand independently of these issues since
the counterexamples to (P→PK) and (P→K) stand independently of them.
Now, it is the standard view in epistemology and philosophy of mind
that representational states other than belief exist (though I will not lean
on this assumption in what follows). For example, it’s widely held that
perceptual states, memorial states, introspective states, intuitive states, and
15For examples see Lyons (2009: 71ff), Schwitzgebel (2015), Wedgwood (2012), and
Weisberg (forthcoming).
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seeming states are representational states that are not constitutively belief
states.16 And because these are representational states they are true if their
contents enjoy the right kind of match with the world. If correct, these non-
doxastic forms of representation are what we might think of as direct forms
of representation, since they are mental states that represent P by having P
as their propositional content.
There is also an indirect way of representing the world as being such that
P. If Q entails P, then believing Q itself involves some interesting notion of
indirect representation of P since Q rules out all the ¬P possibilities (Stal-
nacker 1984). But even if you believe Q this kind of indirect representation
of P is not obviously a normatively significant kind of representation because
the entailment might be too complicated for you to appreciate (recall (NPR)
above). But if Q entails P and you not only believe Q but also believe that Q
entails P, then you are indirectly representing the world as being such that
P in a way that has the potential to be normatively important. For part
of what it means to believe that Q entails P, is that one believes that the
world is structured in such a way that there is no possible way for P to be
false when Q is true. Accordingly, when one believes Q and believes that
Q entails P there in a perfectly legitimate and epistemologically important
sense in which one indirectly represents the world as being such that P is
true even if they fail to believe P.17
16This too is part of the default view in the philosophy of mind. See Schwitzgebel (2015)
and Lyons (2009: 71ff). In epistemology, it’s quite common for epistemologists to maintain
that there are non-doxastic representational experiences with propositional content that
justify belief in the content of those non-doxastic experiences. See, for example, Alston
(1989), Audi (1998), Bealer (2000), Bengson (2015), Bernecker (2009), BonJour (2001),
Chisholm (1977), Feldman and Conee (1985), Fumerton (2001), Lycan (2013), McDowell
(1994), McGrath (2013), Pollock and Cruz (1999), Pryor (2000), Pritchard (2012), Pust
(2000), Sosa (2015), Steup (2000), Tucker (2010), and Turri (2010).
17To give an analogy. Pictures can provide us with some kind of visual (perhaps non-
propositional) representation of the world. Suppose you believed (and knew) you had a
photograph of a photograph of the Mona Lisa. Arguably believing (knowing) that this
second photograph is a photograph of the Mona Lisa ensures that it visually represents
the Mona Lisa despite not being a direct photo of the Mona Lisa. The extent to which
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Some might worry about indirect representation in cases when one’s be-
lief that Q and belief that Q entails P is merely dispositional and thus in
some way not present to one’s conscious reflections, or in cases when a given
thinker is not putting these two beliefs together in such a way that they
can “see” that P logically follows. Such cases are irrelevant. I’m only inter-
ested in cases where a competent deductive reasoner occurrently believes Q
and occurrently believes that Q entails P. I think it clear that such thinkers
genuinely represent the world as being such that P even if they fail to be-
lieve P (occurrently or otherwise). And I will limit my claims about indirect
representation of P to such cases. While I’m open to and optimistic about
more expansive notions of indirect representation being of epistemological
importance, I limit myself to the specified case here since I think it obvious
and uncontroversial that agents who are skilled a deduction can represent
the world as being such that P when they occurrently believe Q and occur-
rently believe that Q entails P. (For convenience I’ll leave the ‘occurrently’
qualification implicit in what follows.)
It is important to note that these other non-doxastic ways of representing
P can be non-accidental in the way that believing P can be. Basically, a
true representation is non-accidental in the relevant sense whenever it stands
in a generalization of the non-accidentality relation required for knowledge.
Again, since there are different accounts of the non-accidentality constraint
on knowledge there will be different options here. Since I cannot walk through
all potential accounts of awareness I’ll just give two examples. First take a
view on which knowledge is safe belief:
Knowledge is Safe Belief
S knows that P iff S could not have easily had a false belief that P
(given the method or process that actually led S to believe P).18
this second photo represents the Mona Lisa will thus be a less direct sort of visual repre-
sentation. And it will also be a visual representation that at least seems to be normatively
significant for the beliefs you should form about the appearance of the Mona Lisa.
18For further characterization and discussion of the safety condition, i.e. the right-hand
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We can generalize this for awareness as follows:
Awareness is Safe Representation (SafeA)
S is aware that P iff S could not have easily had a false represen-
tation that P (given the method or process that actually led S to
represent P).
For an alternative account of awareness take robust virtue reliabilism about
knowledge. At its heart is the attempt to understand knowledge in terms of
non-defective exercises of the competences of agents. More specifically, the
unifying thesis of these reliabilist virtue epistemologists is that we can give
an informative account of knowledge in terms of an agent’s cognitive success
from a non-defective exercise of her cognitive competences (Sosa 2007, 2015;
Greco 2010; cp. Pritchard 2012; Kelp 2013; Miracchi 2015). While there are
plenty of disagreements among virtue reliabilists about how to understand
the relevant ‘from a non-defective exercise’ relation, there are two notable
points of agreement. First, ‘cognitive competences’ are to be understood as
circumstance-relative, reliable abilities to succeed. Second, when it comes
to propositional knowledge the relevant type of cognitive success involves
true belief.19 Accordingly, the unifying thesis of the robust virtue theoretic
approach to knowledge can be put more specifically:
A Virtue Theory of Knowledge
S knows P just in case S truly believes P from a non-defective
exercise of her cognitive competences.
We get a virtue theoretic account of awareness from this by generalizing the
virtue theory of knowledge to all forms of true representation:
A Virtue Theory of Awareness (VirtueA)
S is aware that P just in case S truly represents P from a non-
defective exercise of her cognitive competences.
side of the biconditional, see Williamson (2000), Pritchard (2012), and Kelp (2013).
19Sosa (2015: 10), Greco (2010: 12), Pritchard (2012: 247), Kelp (2013: 265), and
Mirrachi (2015).
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While (VirtueA) is a generalization of the virtue theory of knowledge, it’s
important to note that (VirtueA)’s truth doesn’t depend on the truth of the
virtue theory of knowledge. For example, one could think (as non-robust,
anti-luck virtue epistemologists do) that knowledge requires some further
anti-luck condition, e.g. safety or sensitivity (Pritchard 2012; Kelp 2013,
2018).
Since true belief is not the only way of having a true representation,
and since we can easily give theories of non-accidental true representation
of which knowledge is an instance (=awareness) we arrive at the thesis that
knowing P is not the only way of being aware that P.
5 Awareness and the Possession of Reasons
With substantive accounts of awareness on the table we can appreciate an
alternative theory of the possession of facts construed in terms of awareness
rather than knowledge:
Possession Requires Awareness
(P→A) S possesses a fact P as a reason to φ only if S is in a
position to be aware that P.
(P→PK) and (P→A) are very much alike. Both are epistemically demanding
views of possession, both are views that do not require belief, and both are
factive views. So in this respect, the two views of possession are on a par.
Similarly, both appeal to natural epistemic relations. After all, knowledge
is a non-ad hoc explanatorily rich relation we can stand in to facts. Since
the awareness relation is a very modest generalization from the knowledge
relation it too is a non-ad hoc explanatorily rich relation we can stand in to
facts.20
20See Lord (2018: 94-95) for more on the relevance of “naturalness” in deciding on a
theory of possession.
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Further (P→A) is just as capable as (P→PK) when it comes to explaining
your possession of (F1) and (F2) in Inattentive Perception. For given that
knowledge is a form of awareness two entailments follow: knowing P entails
being aware that P, and being in a position to know P entails being in a
position to be aware that P. So the fact that you’re in a position to know
facts like (F1) and (F2) while inattentive–as Lord argues–ensures that you’re
also in a position to be aware of (F1) and (F2) while inattentive. So the
explanatory power of (P→PK) to handle cases of inattention is completely
carried over to (P→A).
It is easy to see how (P→A) can explain the fact that Agnes does not
possess the fact that her brother is graduating. On (SafeA) this will be
explained by the fact that Agnes cannot safely represent that fact because the
experience machine scenario guarantees that she could easily have had a false
belief. For there are nearby worlds where she falsely represents that fact, e.g.
worlds where the machine feeds her that experience just before or just after
her brother is graduating. On (VirtueA) this will be explained by the fact
that Agnes has no cognitive competence she could non-defectively exercise to
arrive at a representation of the fact that her brother is graduating. The is
because her visual belief-forming competences are not competences (reliable
abilities) relative to the situation that she is actually in within the experience
machine. So on both views Agnes is not simply unaware, she’s also not in
a position to be aware. So (P→A) can easily be used to explain why Agnes
fails to possess the target fact.
Accordingly, (P→A) can explain why Agnes does not possess the fact that
her brother is graduating, and (P→A) can also explain why you do possess
(F1) and (F2) in Inattentive Perception. So (P→A) is on an explanatory par
with both (P→K) and (P→PK).
We saw two objections to (P→PK) and (P→K) above: one from explicit
deductive updates and one from environmental luck. They were cases where
agents possess facts despite failing to be in a position to know them and hence
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failing to know them. (P→A) has no such difficulty, as I’ll now explain.
5.1 Awareness and Explicit Deductive Updates
(P→A) nimbly avoids the problem raised by the application of Extended
Possession to Kripkean Study because (P→A) can easily explain the fact that
I possess (N) before being given a defeater in the psychological study. This is
because (P→A) doesn’t make the potential for knowledge in all (most, many)
nearby worlds a requirement for possession. Rather, all that is required is
that one be in a position to be aware that (N). And in Kripkean Study
I’m not merely in a position to be aware that (N) before being given the
defeater, I’m actually aware that (N) before I’m given the defeater. Recall,
awareness is a matter of non-accidental true representation. (N) is true, and
while I don’t represent (N) by believing (N) there are at least two ways I
might represent (N) without believing (N) in Kripkean Study. First, many
epistemologists think that seeming states are sui generis representational
propositional attitudes that are distinct from belief. Thus even if I do not
believe (N), (N) can still be the content of a seeming state. Perhaps (N)
seems true in virtue of (N) being a newly appreciated logical entailment of
(G) in Kripkean Study. This would be a case of direct representation of (N)
because (N) is the propositional content of the seeming state.
But we needn’t rely so much on seemings. For in Kripkean Study I
occurrently believe (G) and occurrently believe that (G) entails (N) for some
short amount of time. Through that short span of time I indirectly represent
(N) as being true in virtue of the fact that I’m a competent deductive reasoner
who occurrently believes (G) and occurrently believes that (G) entails (N).
Accordingly, so long as my indirect representation of (N) is non-accidental
in the way required for awareness, I count as being aware of the fact that
(N). And in the present circumstances it is non-accidental in that way. For
I know (G) prior to being given defeaters, and I also know that (G) entails
(N), and I’m a competent deductive reasoner. Since we’re assuming things
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are otherwise normal prior to being given the defeater, I can be aware that
(N) even before I believe it.
It is easy to see how (VirtueA) delivers awareness of (N) in this case.
For knowing (G) and knowing that (G) entails (N) while being a competent
deductive reasoner ensures that my indirect representation of (N) is from a
conditionally reliable competence to indirectly represent facts–that is, it is
reliable conditional on the truth of the premises. Perhaps it’s less obvious how
(SafeA) could deliver awareness of (N). To see this notice that my indirect
representation of (N) counts as safe in a sufficiently relevant sense. For before
I’ve been given the defeater for (G) I know (G) and I know that (G) entails
(N). Thus if knowledge requires safety, my beliefs in these premises will be
safe. And so an indirect representation of (N) will count as derivatively safe
when it’s constituted by safe belief in (G) and safe belief in (G) entails (N)
when one is a competent deductive reasoner. So even on the modally more
demanding view of awareness, (SafeA), we can explain the consistency of
(P→A) with cases like Kripkean Dogmatist. So not only is (P→A) consistent
with Extended Possession and Explicit Deductive Updating, it can also explain
the fact that I possess (N) before being given a defeater for it in Kripkean
Study.
(P→A) neatly avoids the problem raised by Kripkean Study because I’m
actually aware of (N), and thereby count as being in a position to be aware
of (N). This raises the question: when one is not actually aware that P, when
is one in a position to be aware that P? We need only take Lord’s (2018:
92) proffered conditions for inferential and non-inferential cases of being in
a position to know and generalize from knowledge to awareness:
Counterfactual Inferential Awareness
When S is not already aware that P, S is in a position to be
inferentially aware that P iff S has some beliefs with contents such
that, if S could and did attend to those contents and inferentially
form a belief that P in the right way, S would be aware that P.
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Counterfactual Non-Inferential Awareness
When S is not already aware that P, S is in a position to be non-
inferentially aware that P iff S has some experiences such that,
if S could and did attend to certain features of those experiences
and non-inferentially form a belief that P in the right kind of way,
then S would be aware that P.
Against these counterfactual conditions I can imagine someone trying to
produce a version of Kripkean Study in cases like Inattentive Perception.
This might be a case where, while you’re actually inattentive to (F1) and
(F2) while looking at my carpet I stand poised to quickly deliver a defeater
for (F1) and (F2) if I get even a whiff of you thinking too much about the
carpet (e.g. perhaps I’ve even planted colored lights above the carpet and I’m
prepared to tell you some nonsense about carpet squares being illuminated
by blue lights to teach my family and friends about undercutting defeaters).
If so, and if you haven’t already become aware that (F1) and (F2) are
true (thereby triggering the limiting condition), then it seems to me entirely
intuitive to claim that you don’t possess (F1) or (F2). Doubtless they are
facts that are “right there” for you to appreciate in some broadly modal sense.
But the fact that you do not actually appreciate them and the fact that you’re
only accidentally related to (F1) and (F2)–since the nearby worlds are ones
where you’d likely be given a defeater were you to attempt to appreciate
them–seem to me to make these facts normatively irrelevant when it comes
to assessing whether or not your non-belief in (MoreBlue) is unjustified.
Those readers who have the lingering thought that you do possess (F1)
and (F2) despite these circumstances are, I suspect, in the grip of a rep-
resentationalist view of perceptual experience on which perception can give
you (F1) and (F2) directly even if you don’t believe them. If so, that’s
fine. For then you will count as already being aware that (F1) and (F2)
are true since perception that (F1) and (F2) would typically put you in the
knowledge-relevant non-accidental relation to (F1) and (F2). So the initial
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limiting condition of Counterfactual Non-Inferential Awareness will not be
satisfied in that case because you count as already being aware of (F1) and
(F2). Thus, according to (P→A), you will already possess (F1) and (F2).
5.2 Awareness and Environmental Luck
Above we saw that treating cases of environmental luck as Gettier cases
supports the following two theses:
No Environmentally Lucky Knowledge: Usual cases of environ-
mental luck are cases of non-accidental true belief that P, but the
type of non-accidentality present in cases of environmental luck
is insufficient for knowing or being in a position to know P.
Environmentally Lucky Possession: S can possess the fact P as
a reason even if one’s non-accidental true belief that P is formed
in circumstances involving environmental luck.
This is a problem for advocates of (P→K) and (P→PK).
But it is easy to see how an advocate of (P→A) could accommodate the
thought that we possess reasons in cases of environmental luck. For example,
one could adopt (VirtueA) while maintaining some kind of modal anti-luck
condition that only applies to knowledge (safety, sensitivity). On this ap-
proach, knowledge will have a more demanding non-accidentality condition
than awareness. This is something non-robust, anti-luck virtue epistemol-
ogists will find attractive (Pritchard 2012; Kelp 2013). For on their view,
cases of environmental luck involve a genuine cognitive achievement even
though they fall short of knowledge, and the relevant cognitive achievement
is explicitly identified as an instance of (VirtueA): true belief (and hence true
representation) from a non-defective exercise of a relevant cognitive ability.
But to know, they argue, one’s cognitive achievement must satisfy some fur-
ther modal anti-luck condition (safety, sensitivity).
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For those of us who think that knowledge is incompatible with environ-
mental luck, one of the nice things about going on to endorse (P→A) together
with a condition like (VirtueA) is that it provides a way of seeing how cases
of environmental luck form a middle-ground between knowledge and igno-
rance. For while Henry doesn’t know that the object he’s looking at is a
barn, he’s not ignorant of that fact either. So what’s in between knowledge
and ignorance? Intuitively, it’s something robustly epistemic that puts one
in possession of facts. After all, if Henry were not in a robustly epistemic
relation to the target fact there would presumably not be so much debate
over whether or not environmental luck cases are cases of knowledge. Since
awareness is robustly epistemic we have our middle ground as well as a novel
explanation for why some epistemologists have been (wrongly) tempted to
think there is knowledge in cases of environmental luck. For awareness is so
much like knowledge (in being a certain generalization of it) that it’s presence
in cases of environmental luck was doubtless going to mislead some reflective
people.
To conclude, in this section we’ve seen that identifying possession in some
way with the more general state of non-accidental true representation (aware-
ness) can also explain the facts we possess in cases of environmental luck and
in cases involving certain deductive belief-updating procedures. In contrast,
knowledge-centric accounts of possession cannot explain the facts we possess
in such cases. Accordingly, we have our main conclusion: accounts of pos-
session framed in terms of the more general state of non-accidental true rep-
resentation (awareness) are at least as well placed to explain our possession
of facts as existing knowledge-centric accounts, and they are better placed to
explain our possession of facts than existing knowledge-centric accounts.
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6 Concluding Reflections on Lord, Lotteries,
and Other Counterexamples to Knowledge-
Centric Theories of Possession
While this paper has focused on the epistemic condition required for possess-
ing reasons–i.e. possessing facts–it’s worth pausing to see how the arguments
of this paper might impact other aspects involved in formulating an adequate
theory of possession. For example, Lord (2018: Chapter 4) argues for the
following claims:
Lord’s Theory of Possessing Reasons (LPR). S possesses a fact P
as a reason to φ iff S is in a position to manifest knowledge about
how to use P to φ.
Lord’s Entailment Thesis (LET). If S is in a position to manifest
knowledge about how to use P to φ, then S is in a position to
know P.
In the course of arguing for (P→A) above I provided two arguments for
thinking that one can possess a fact as a reason to respond in some way
without being in a position to know it. In the case of environmental luck
I argued that one can possess the fact that a barn is nearby as a reason
to run it its direction, without being in a position to know that a barn
is nearby. In the case of Kripkean Study I argued that one could possess
the fact that (N) as a reason to update one’s beliefs without being in a
position to know (N). Notice that this entails something important about
the conjunction of (LPR) and (LET): namely, (LP) and (LET) cannot both
be true.21 Therefore, either Lord’s theory of possessing facts as reasons to
21For if (LEC) is false as I’ve argued, then it’s possible that (i) I possess a fact as a
reason, even if (ii) I’m not in a position to know it. But if (i) I possess a fact as a reason
to φ, then (iii) I’m in a position to manifest knowledge about how to use that reason
to φ (by LP). And if (iii) I’m in a position to manifest such knowledge-how, then (iv) I
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φ is mistaken, or Lord’s entailment thesis is mistaken. I do not have space
here to explore this further.
The next issue to discuss concerns lottery cases and their attendant form
of modal luck. Above I argued that we could exploit the theory of awareness
in such a way that we can be aware of and possess facts in cases of environ-
mental luck while failing to know them. All that is required is that awareness
be somewhat less demanding than knowledge. I illustrated this possibility
for (P→A) by appealing to (VirtueA) while maintaining some kind of modal
anti-luck condition that only applies to knowledge (safety, sensitivity). But
lottery-like cases generate worries about the stability of this position (cf.
Williamson 2000: 200ff).
To see the problem take a standard lottery case:
Lottery
You have a ticket for a fair lottery with very long odds. The
lottery has been drawn, although you have not heard the result
yet. Reflecting on the odds involved you conclude (L) that your
ticket is a loser. Besides your competent assessment of the odds,
you have no other reason to think your ticket is a loser. As it
turns out, your belief that you own a losing ticket is true.
A common judgement about (L) is that it cannot be known on statistical
evidence alone and therefore you cannot be in a position to know (L) in
Lottery (Hawthorne 2004; Williamson 2000). Together with (P→PK) this
has the intuitive consequence that you cannot possess (L) as a reason to
believe or act. For instance, you cannot have (L) as a reason to sell your
ticket or to believe that you will not have enough money to go on an expensive
vacation later in the year. This raises problems for endorsing (P→A) together
with a theory of awareness, like (VirtueA), that allows you to be aware of
facts in cases of environmental luck. I emphasize, this is not a problem for
am in a position to know it (by LET). But (iv) contradicts (ii). So (LP) and (LET) are
incompatible with the falsehood of (LEC).
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(P→A) itself, rather it is a problem with theories of awareness like (VirtueA)
that don’t rule out possession in cases like Lottery.
Fortunately, this problem can largely be avoided by appreciating a certain
form of defeat that seems to apply in typical lottery cases. For it is plausible
that you cannot have sufficient reason (=justification) to believe (L)–despite
your statistical reasons–if you have further undefeated reason to think that
you’re not in position to know (L). For being in a position to know (L) re-
quires that your over-all circumstances are hospitable to knowledge. Thus
having undefeated reason to think that your circumstances prohibit the pos-
sibility of knowing (L) seems like the kind of higher-order information that
can defeat one’s justification for responding to (L) (Smithies 2012; Prado
forthcoming).
How is it that you and other reflective agents come to have undefeated
reason to think that you’re not in a position to know (L)? In my experience
people usually flag the modal defect with lottery propositions like (L) by
appreciating that their ticket might be a winner–i.e. (L) might be false–
and by concluding from that fact that they don’t know (L). So provided
one cannot be justified in believing (L) if one has sufficient reason to think
one doesn’t know (L), it will follow that one must lack sufficient reason to
believe (L) despite it’s statistical support. Notice that the conclusion is
not that one lacks any reason to believe (L). Rather, the claim is that in
Lottery cases where one has undefeated (=sufficient) reason to think they
don’t know (L) one lacks sufficient reason to believe (L). So, in my view,
while (P→A) and (VirtueA) ensure that it’s possible for thinkers to possess
and have sufficient reason to respond to (L), typically mature thinkers also
possess further reasons that prevent them from having sufficient reason to
respond to (L) in belief and action.
The final thing to discuss before concluding concerns further potential
counterexamples to (P→K) and (P→PK). For as I mentioned above that
many believe there are ways of representing a fact without belief. All of
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these ways can be used to generate instances of awareness without belief.
For example, some have argued that one can see that P without believing
and hence without knowing P (McDowell 1998; Pritchard 2012b; Turri 2010;
Schroeder MS); others have argued that one can remember that P without
believing that P (Bernecker 2010); similar claims can be made about per-
ception in general (hearing that P, tasting that P, etc.), rational intuition
that P (Bealer 2000; Pust 2000), and perhaps even the idea of having been
informed by someone else that P. If there is a range of representational states
wherein one can non-accidentally represent P without believing it, then the
counterexamples to (P→K) and (P→PK) will be many. While I’m rather
optimistic about this expansion of counterexamples, they tend to rely on
controversial assumptions. So I’ve set discussion of them aside.
In conclusion, I’ve argued against putting knowledge-first within the reasons-
first framework. The good news is that there is an alternative view, (P→A).
(P→A) does at least as well as (P→PK) when it comes to explaining the
reasons we fail to possess in Littlejohn’s case of Agnes and the reasons we pos-
sess Lord’s cases of inattention. Moreover, (P→A) does better than (P→PK)
when it comes to explaining the reasons we possess in cases of environmen-
tal luck and cases involving explicit deductive updates. Indeed, Extended
Possession, Explicit Deductive Updates, and Kripkean Study generate no
problems for (P→A). At the very least, then, (P→A) represents a unique
and theoretically interesting theory of the epistemic demands of possessing
reasons that has so far gone unconsidered in the expanding literature on
possession.
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